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B-1 bomber, saying that the B-1 was merely shelved in favor of newer and. more effective
strategic weapons.254 And also in early July Soviet television began to discuss and
denounce the neutron bomb s development to the general populace.255
On July 21 the neutron bomb was criticized by Warsaw Pact representatives in the
ongoing NATO-Warsaw Pact troop reduction negotiations, and a two-month recess in the
meetings was abruptly called. Each side accused the other of holding up progress; for the
previous four years of negotiations, however, no agreements of any consequence had been
reached.256 Ten days later the Soviet new agency Tass rejected Carter s description of the
neutron bomb as a tactical weapon257 and remarked that the bomb s development can
252
For a discussion of Soviet European theater posture at the time of the neutron bomb episode, see Chapter Four. See also
Thomas Wolfe, Military Power and Soviet Policy in William E. Griffith (Ed.), The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Détente
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976), pages #179-195. See also Coit Dennis Blacker, The Soviet Perception of European
Security in Derek Leebaert (Ed.), European Security: Prospects for the 1980s (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1979), pages
#137-161. See also Richard G. Head, Technology and the Military Balance in Wolfram Hanrieder (Ed.), Arms Control and
Security: Current Issues (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).
253
New York Times, June 20, 1977, page #10.
254
New York Times, July 10, 1977, page #1.
255
New York Times, July 13, 1977, page #11.
256
New York Times, July 22, 1977, page #6.
257
Carter, Jimmy, press conference, July 12, 1977.
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only bring the world closer to a. nuclear holocaust .258
The first major statement was published in Pravda at the beginning of August. Georgi
A. Arbatov, the Soviet Union s most prominent specialist on United States affairs, said that
the U.S.S.R. s critical attitude was sincere, not propagandistic as accused by President
Carter. Responsibility for the current chill in détente, argued Arbatov, was Carter s for
his insistence upon meddling in the internal affairs of other countries through his human
rights campaign. The neutron bomb came in for a share of heavy criticism, and Arbatov
concluded by expressing concern that the atmosphere of cooperation worked out by
Nixon and Brezhnev was now being undermined by the Carter Administration.259
Arbatov s assault was followed by another statement from Tass accusing Carter of
yielding to the Pentagon in approving the neutron bomb by his signing of the Public
Works bill that included the ERDA financing for the bomb s development. The United
States, said Tass, would bear full responsibility for the consequences of this dangerous
step .260 Simultaneously the government newspaper Izvestia published a petition by 28
communist parties in North America. and Europe to ban the bomb.261
The first statement on the neutron bomb by Leonid Brezhnev himself was included in
a. speech on August 17 welcoming Yugoslavia s Tito to the U.S.S.R. on a state visit.
SALT talks, said Brezhnev, had been slowed down by the hostile propaganda campaign
on the civil rights issue; he also criticized the neutron bomb funding.262
Such initial Soviet reactions to the bomb were predictably condemnatory, but they
also seemed to be somewhat perfunctory and rhetorical. One explanation for this may be
that the Soviets were sensitive to the danger of creating Western enthusiasm for the bomb
by seeming overly worried about it; another might be that they were simply undecided as
to its real significance and wanted to register disapproval without making a major issue out
of it, which could have jeopardized progress that the U.S.S.R. wished to make at the
ongoing SALT-II talks.
On November 2 Leonid Brezhnev delivered a Report at a Joint Meeting of the CPSU
Central Committee. Every new type of weapon, he said, represents an equation having
several unknown quantities in terms of political as well as military-technical or strategic
consequences. Rushing from one type of arms to another - apparently with the naive hope
of retaining a monopoly on them - only accelerates the arms race, heightens mutual
distrust, and hampers disarmament measures. The Soviet Union would continue to
ensure its defensive capabilities, he added, but it would not seek military superiority over
the other side. He characterized the existing relation of forces as being in a rough
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